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Abstract. Decision on the use of diﬀerent advertising media is a critical issue in marketing.
Drawing on some literature related to the dynamic Nerlove-Arrow model, we propose a non-
linear programming framework for discussing how diﬀerent advertising media may jointly
aﬀect the demand for a good. Starting from the idea that diﬀerent advertising eﬀorts may
not simply add (linearly) to produce the demand result, we examine a few special media
combination mechanisms which can be represented by smooth functions.
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Kotler and Trias de Bes in the opening of “Lateral Marketing: New Techniques for Finding
Breakthrough Ideas”, notice that “reaching success at the beginning of the twenty–ﬁrst
century is more diﬃcult” [11, p. 3], and they suggest that one reason is that “audiences are
so diverse in their media habits that companies have to invest in many media to reach them”
[11, p. 11]. Therefore, advertising for the launch of new products, for example, is more and
more expensive. The choice of a ﬁrm advertising eﬀort in a given period while using a set
of diﬀerent media is crucial and must take into account diﬀerent features of the joint use of
media. This leads to so called integrated marketing communication, which “emphazises the
beneﬁts of harnessing synergy across multiple media to build brand equity of products and
services” [14]. Then the problem of allocating marketing resources to multiple activities, in
particular diﬀerent media, is a relevant problem [15].
The joint impact of multiple advertising activities (e.g. television and print adversiting)
creates added value, a phenomenon which is known as synergy [14]. At a ﬁrst approxi-
mation level, one may consider simple superposition of the eﬀects of diﬀerent advertising
activities. We may also observe advertising saturation [11, p. 11], which lowers communi-
cation eﬀectiveness, and even negative interference among advertising messages. Additivity
of advertising eﬀorts is a customary assumption in game theoretic literature, where diﬀer-
ent advertising strategies are chosen by diﬀerent agents (see e.g. [10], [9, pages 103, 108,
119], [18], [22]). Additivity, there, is chosen mainly to obtain tractable models. The typical
situation concerns a distribution channel, where two agents (a manufacturer and a retailer)
advertise the same product using diﬀerent means, in order to obtain higher proﬁts.
Here, we want to model the joint eﬀect of several advertising media from a wide view-
point and discuss a consequent, rather general proﬁt problem. We choose a static framework,
and hence obtain a nonlinear programming problem statement. The study should pave the
way to tackle, on the one hand, dynamic proﬁt problems with several advertising media
and, on the other hand, static or dynamic game theoretic analysis of distribution channel
problems.
A ﬁrst paper addressing marketing decisions as a nonlinear programming problem is
due to Dorfman and Steiner [4]. Recently, an analogous problem has been discussed in [21],
where the focus is on the market heterogeneity. On the other hand, static games have been
proposed in marketing contexts (e.g. [10], [18] and [22]) and, in particular, Schoonbeek and
Kooreman [18] stress the importance of static modelling of advertising decision making.
Essentially, the choice of a static framework is reasonable in those situations in which either
goodwill depreciates rapidly see e.g. [3], or the time horizon is short.
Our problem is essentially a case of single-output proﬁt maximization in the Theory of
the Firm (see e.g. [13, Chapter 5, Production]): advertising eﬀorts using diﬀerent media
are the “inputs”, actual demand for the good is the “output”, sale of the good in the market
determines revenue, and the ﬁrm wants to maximize proﬁt. We focus on the transformation
of inputs into ouput, i.e. on the way advertising eﬀorts determine demand for the good.
In the paper [21] the advertising eﬀorts combination is represented in the simplest way,
by means of a linear model, and the focus is on the market heterogeneity. Such a linearity
assumption is essentially the same as adopted to model the joint eﬀect of the advertising
1eﬀorts of diﬀerent (usually two) decision makers in a distribution channel (see [7], [6], [8]
for dynamic models, and [9, p. 103], [22] for static ones). Here we consider a homogeneous
market, instead of a heterogeneous one, in order to focus on the combination mechanism of
the diﬀerent advertising eﬀorts.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the general
problem. In Section 3 we characterize the optimal solutions of the proﬁt problem. In
Section 4 we analyze the problem and its solutions for some special advertising productivity
models.
2 Advertising, goodwill, demand
Let G be the stock of goodwill of the good, and let the demand for the good be an increasing
and concave function of G,
D = f(G), (1)
where f(G) ≥ 0, f′(G) > 0, f′′(G) ≤ 0. This is in agreement with similar assumptions on
demand rates in some known dynamic models (see e.g. [16], [5], [19]).
The goodwill G is the result of the ﬁrm advertising activity, which involves n diﬀerent
advertising media. For all i = 1, ... n, we denote by ui ≥ 0 the advertising eﬀort using the
i-th medium and we assume that the eﬀect of the joint media use on goodwill is represented
by
G = Φ(u) + G0 = Φ(u1, u2, ... un) + G0 , (2)
where the advertising productivity function Φ : [0,+∞)n → [0,+∞) is a continuously dif-
ferentiable functions, increasing and such that Φ(0) = 0, whereas G0 is the no-ad goodwill.





where γi > 0 is the marginal productivity of the advertising eﬀort using the ith medium, in
terms of goodwill, i = 1, ... n. Here the eﬀect of the joint media activation on goodwill is
the sum of the media separate eﬀects.
The special model (3) has been used in [21], where an advertising process toward a
segmented market was considered. Moreover, (3) is in agreement with some assumptions
adopted to model the manufacturer-retailer interaction, in the framework of dynamic game
theory (see [7], [6], [8]), and of static game theory (see [9, p. 103]).
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that the linear model (3) should provide a faithful repre-
sentation of a market reaction to advertising. At a higher (representation) ﬂexibility level





2where for all i = 1, ... n, ϕi : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is increasing, concave and such that
ϕi (0) = 0; moreover, assuming that ϕi is twice continuously diﬀerentable, we require that
ϕ′
i(ui) > 0, and ϕ′′
i (ui) ≤ 0.
An example of non-additive advertising model is provided by [2], and documented also in
[9, p. 106]: it assumes a polinomial representation of the joint eﬀect of diﬀerent advertising
eﬀorts on sales.
We want to analyze the problem of maximizing the ﬁrm proﬁt




where π > 0 is the marginal proﬁt of goodwill, gross of advertising costs, and ci(ui) is the
cost associated with the ith medium level ui ≥ 0. We assume that ci(ui) is an increasing,
convex, and continuoulsly diﬀerentiable function, where ci(0) = 0, c′
i(ui) ≥ 0, c′′
i (ui) > 0,
and limui→∞ c′
i(ui) = +∞.
We ﬁrst consider the important case of a model with a twice continuously diﬀerentable
function Φ, obtaining the characterization of optimal solutions to the proﬁt problem; we
go into details of the special linear and nonlinear additive advertising models (3), (4); we
introduce and analyze a nonlinear multiplicative advertising model.
3 The proﬁt problem
Here we assume that the advertising productivity function Φ(u) is continuous in the do-
main [0,+∞)n and twice continuously diﬀerentable in (0,+∞)n, moreover we require that
∂Φ/∂ui > 0, i = 1, ... n.
3.1 Optimal advertising eﬀort
Theorem 1 If u∗ is an optimal solution with associated goodwill level G∗, then, for all
i = 1, ... n,
• either u∗














Proof: The proﬁt Π(u) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function and its partial derivative








Then the conditions (6) and (7) are the ﬁrst order necessary conditions for the ith coordinate
of a maximum point (see e.g. [12, p. 314]) in the two distinct cases that the ith medium is
really used or not. 2
3Remark: It may occur that an optimal solution has no zero component, or some zero
components, or even is the zero vector. For the last case to occur, i.e. for the decision of





i(0), for all i. (9)
This condition might be satisﬁed in case of a large no-ad goodwill G0 and strictly positive
marginal advertising costs at advertising level 0.
Theorem 2 If the function Φ(u) is concave, then a point u∗ satisfying the necessary con-
ditions of Theorem 1 is an optimal solution.
Proof: Let Φ(u) be concave, so that its Hessian matrix ∇2Φ(u) is negative semideﬁnite.
The Hessian matrix of the proﬁt function is
∇2Π(u) = πf′′(G)(∇Φ(u))









which is negative semideﬁnite as the sum of three matrices of this kind. Hence the proﬁt
function Π(u) is concave, which makes the necessary conditions also suﬃcient for the opti-
mum (see e.g. [12, p. 181]). 2
Theorem 3 If the function Φ(u) is monotonically increasing and concave, then there exists
an optimal solution u∗ to the proﬁt problem.
Proof: The hypothesis states that ∇Φ(u) ≥ 0 and that ∇2Φ(u) is negative semideﬁnite.
If Π(u) ≤ 0 for all u ≥ 0, then u∗ = 0 is an optimal solution.
Alternatively, let Π(u) > 0 at some u.
For all u ≥ 0, u  = 0, and t > 0 the following inequality holds
d










because G = Φ(tu) + G0 ≥ G0, f′( ) is a decreasing function and π∇Φ(tu)u > 0. The








i < 0, (11)
where ∇2Φ( ) is negative semideﬁnite and c′′
i ( ) > 0. Moreover, ψ(t,u) < 0 for suﬃciently
large t, because limui→∞ c′
i(ui) = +∞. Hence, the equation
ψ(t,u) = 0
4deﬁnes implicitly a function ˆ t : [0,+∞)n \ {0} → [0,+∞) such that ψ(ˆ t(u),u) = 0 for
all u. Moreover, the assumptions of the implicit function Theorem (see [17, p. 224] are
satisﬁed, because of (11), and ˆ t(u) is a diﬀerentiable function. We observe that
Π(tu) ≤ Π(ˆ t(u)u), t ≥ ˆ t(u),
and in particular this is true for all vectors u with unit norm. Therefore, a point u∗ is an
optimal solution of the proﬁt problem if and only if u∗ = tu, with (t,u) optimal solution of
the following problem,
max Π(tu),
s.t. t ≥ 0, u ∈ [0,+∞)n ,
 u  = 1,
t − ˆ t(u) ≤ 0,
which has a compact feasible set and a continuous objective function. Therefore there exists
a maximum point of the proﬁt Π. 2
4 Special advertising productivity models
Here we consider two main ways to model advertising productivity: the additive and the
nonlinear multiplicative.
4.1 Additive advertising model
In the case of the additive advertising model (4), where Φ(u) =
Pn
i=1 ϕi(ui), with the
assumptions stated in Section 2, the function Φ( ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
increasing and concave; therefore, from Theorems 1-3 we have that there exists an optimal
solution u∗ which determines the goodwill value G∗ = Φ(u∗) + G0, such that for all i =
1, ... n,
• either u∗











The linear advertising model (3) is a special case in which ϕ′
i = γi; it is the homogeneous
market case of the model discussed in [21].
In the following examples we propose the analysis of some special instances of the
problem under the additive advertising assumption.





i , i = 1, ... n, (14)
5where ki > 0. Now the condition (13) is equivalent to πf′(G∗)ϕ′
i(0) ≤ 0, which contradicts
our general assumption that f′ > 0 and ϕ′
i > 0; therefore any optimal solution u∗ must be
positive and, for all i, equation (12) must hold, i.e.
πf′(Φ(u) + G0)ϕ′
i(ui) = kiui , i = 1, ... n. (15)
From the implicit function Theorem (see [17, p. 224] we obtain that u∗ is a diﬀerentiable
function of (k1,... kn,π,G0).
Example 1.1 Assume ci(ui) = 1
2kiu2
i, i = 1, ... n, and linear demand
f(G) = βG, (16)
where β > 0. The optimality conditions (15) become
πβϕ′
i(ui) = kiui , i = 1, ... n, (17)
and are n independent equations. As ϕ′
i(ui) > 0 and ϕ′′
i (ui) ≤ 0, the ith condition has
a unique solution u∗
i > 0. Therefore there exists a unique solution u∗ > 0 to the proﬁt
problem. Clearly the solution does not depend on the no-ad goodwill G0, as this parameter
does not enter the optimality conditions. On the other hand, from the implicit function
Theorem we obtain that u∗
i is a diﬀerentiable function of (ki,π,β), it is decreasing in the
cost factor ki, and increasing in the proﬁt margin and goodwill eﬃciency parameters π, β.
As a special instance (see [18] for a use of it), let
ϕi(ui) = γi
√
ui , i = 1, ... n, (18)














We observe, of course, that the optimal advertising eﬀort u∗
i is an increasing function of the
eﬀectiveness parameter γi.
As a second special instance, let us consider the linear advertising model (3), i.e. the
additive model with
ϕi(ui) = γiui , i = 1, ... n,
where γi > 0. Then the equation (17) reads







6Again we notice that the optimal advertising eﬀort u∗
i increases with γi.
Example 1.2 Assume ci(ui) = 1
2kiu2
i, i = 1, ... n, and logarithmic demand
f(G) = β ln(1 + G),





j=1 ϕj(uj) + G0 = kiui , i = 1, ... n. (19)
For any given values of uj, j  = i, the above condition has a unique solution ˆ ui > 0, because
ϕ′
i(ui) > 0 and ϕ′′
i (ui) ≤ 0. Nevertheless, ˆ ui depends on the given values of uj, j  = i, and
this may allow multiple solutions to the optimality conditions.
As a special instance, let us consider the linear advertising model (3), Φ(u) =
Pn
i=1 γiui.
Then the equation (19), with ϕ′




j=1 γjuj + G0 = kiui , i = 1, ... n. (20)








j=1 γjuj + G0 ,
so that (20) gives the unique (positive) solution
u∗
i =















In the special symmetric case with the linear advertising model, i.e. with














, i = 1, ... n.
On the other hand, in a symmetric situation with a general nonlinear advertising model,
i.e. with
ϕi( ) = ϕ( ), ki = k, i = 1, ... n,
we obtain that a solution u must have equal components ui = z, where z is the unique
solution of the equation
πβϕ′(z) = kz
￿
1 + G0 + nϕ(z)
￿
.
74.2 Nonlinear multiplicative advertising model
We call nonlinear multiplicative the advertising model in which the goodwill is determined





where for all i = 1, ... n, ϕi : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is increasing, concave and such that
ϕi (0) = ϕ0
i ≥ 0. We assume further that ϕi is twice continuously diﬀerentable and we
require that ϕ′
i(ui) > 0 and ϕ′′
i (ui) ≤ 0. Hence, the function Φ( ) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and increasing, whereas it is not concave in general.
Theorem 1 of Section 3.1 holds here and states that if the point u∗ is an optimal solution,
then for G∗ =
Qn
i=1 ϕi(u∗
i) + G0 and for all i = 1, ... n,
• either u∗



















On the other hand, we cannot use Theorems 2-3 to state suﬃciency of the conditions
above nor existence of an optimal solution, because Φ may not be concave. In fact, we know
from [1, p. 162, Corollary 5.18] that the function Φ, as deﬁned by the product (21) under
our assumptions, is semistrictly quasi-concave.
In the following subsections we consider two cases of nonlinear multiplicative advertising
model with concave Φ.
4.2.1 Cobb–Douglas advertising model








where αi > 0, i = 1, ... n, and
Pn
i=1 αi ≤ 1. This case is particularly interesting, because
the Cobb–Douglas function is a typical choice as production function in microeconomics,
see e.g. [13, p. 130].
The function (24) is monotonically increasing, has the nonnegative orthant of Rn as its
domain, and in view of the above parameter conditions is a concave function (see [1, p. 161,
Lemma 5.14]). Then Φ has decreasing or constant returns to scale, which is a reasonable
feature of the advertising process. We notice that this would not be true if
Pn
i=1 αi > 1. As
far as the optimization problem is concerned, Theorems 2-3 hold, in addition to Theorem 1,




i)αi +G0, such that for all i = 1, ... n, either the condition (22) or (23) holds.
In this case, either all non-zero solutions u  = 0 are too expensive and u∗ = 0 is the
unique optimal solution, or there exists an interior solution u∗ to the optimality conditions,
and then u∗ is the unique optimal solution.
Example 2 Assume quadratic costs, ci(ui) = kiu2
i/2, i = 1, ... n, linear demand, f(G) =

















j = kiui , i = 1, ... n,
i.e., after setting ui = eyi, the system of linear equations








, i = 1, ... n,
which has a unique solution, because its coeﬃcient matrix is strictly diagonally dominant
and then nonsingular (see [20, p. 6, Theorem 1.4]). In the case of two media, n = 2, we

















4.2.2 An enhanced advertising model: two media
We consider here the nonlinear multiplicative advertising model, representing a pair of
media, with advertising productivity function
Φ(u1,u2) = ϕ1(u1)ϕ2(u2), (26)









9We observe that ϕ1 and ϕ2 are positive, twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave func-
tions; moreover ϕ2 is bounded,
ϕ2([0,+∞)) = [1,21−α).
The model represents a situation in which the medium 1 is the main advertising instrument,
which is necessary to raise the goodwill level, whereas the medium 2 is a supporting medium,
which enhances the main medium eﬀect, but has no eﬀect on the goodwill if used alone.
The function (26) is monotonically increasing and concave (see [1, p. 163, Corollary
5.19]). Again Φ has decreasing or constant returns to scale. Then Theorems 2-3 hold,
in addition to Theorem 1, and we have that there exists an optimal solution u∗ which
determines the goodwill value G∗ =
Qn
i=1 ϕi(u∗
i) + G0, such that for all i = 1, ... n, either
the condition (22) or (23) holds.
Example 3 Assume quadratic costs, ci(ui) = kiu2
i/2, i = 1, ... n, and linear demand,
f(G) = βG. If an optimal solution u∗ has both coordinates positive, u∗
1 > 0, u∗
2 > 0, then















(1+u2)2 = k2u2 ,
which has a unique solution.
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